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ABSTRACT
In this paper we compare sources of economic growth in Japan and the United States from 1975
through 2003, focusing on the role of information technology (IT). We have adjusted Japanese data
to conform to U.S. definitions in order to provide a rigorous comparison between the two economies.
The adjusted data show that the share of the Japanese gross domestic product devoted to investment
in computers, telecommunications equipment, and software rose sharply after 1995. The contribution
of total factor productivity growth from the IT sector in Japan also increased, while the contributions
of labor input and productivity growth from the Non-IT sector lagged far behind the United States.
Our projection of potential economic growth in Japan from for the next decade is substantially below
that in the United States, mainly due to slower growth of labor input. Our projections of labor
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Information Technology and the Japanese Economy   
1. Introduction 
Jorgenson (2002b) has shown that a substantial part of the American growth resurgence 
after 1995 can be attributed to information technology (IT). The rapid growth in U.S. labor 
productivity during the boom of the 1990’s, the economic slowdown that began in 2001, and 
the subsequent recovery suggests that the potential growth of the U.S. economy has been 
considerably enhanced.3    By contrast, the Japanese economy appears to be mired in the 
slump that followed the collapse of the “bubble economy” of the 1980’s. This leads to the 
question, has the Japanese economy failed to benefit from advances in information 
technology? 
There are many examples of cutting-edge businesses in the U.S., such as Dell and Wal-Mart, 
that produce and use information technology effectively. While it is often argued that major 
Japanese businesses do not fully utilize information systems, research conducted in Japan 
shows that the burgeoning levels of IT investment by businesses during the last half of the 
1990’s did contribute substantially to increased labor productivity growth.4  It is clear that 
the impact of investment in IT on both the Japanese and U.S. economies has been very 
sizeable. But how does the impact of this investment differ between the two countries?   
In order to compare the relationships between investment in information technology 
equipment and software and productivity growth in Japan and the United States, it is 
essential to lessen the differences in the treatment of IT in the official statistics. Under the 
United Nations System of National Accounts of 1993 (SNA93)5  software is recognized as an 
investment in both countries, but the definitions are different. Second, prices of equipment 
and software must be measured in a consistent way, reflecting advances in information 
technology.  
                                                  
3  Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2004) have analyzed the potential growth of the U.S. economy.   
4  See Economic Research Institute, Economic Planning Agency (2000). 
5  See United Nations (1993).    3 
We have adopted the framework of Jorgenson (2002a) for analyzing the relationship between 
investment in IT and economic growth, encompassing the impact of IT investment by 
household and government sectors as well as the business sector. An important objective of 
this paper is to develop data for Japan that are comparable to the U.S. National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA). We have constructed new data on software investment for Japan 
and new IT price data to mitigate possible biases present in the Japanese national accounts. 
Exploiting this new information, we have constructed growth accounts for Japan between 
1975 and 2003, and developed growth projections for the next 10 years.     
In the following section we present an analytical framework introduced by Jorgenson (1995c), 
based on the production possibility frontier.6  In Section 3 we describe the data on investment 
in information technology equipment and software for Japan and the U.S. and address 
possible upward biases in the official IT price data for Japan. In Section 4 we present the 
results of our analysis of the role of information technology in the growth of the Japanese 
and U.S. economies. Section 5 is devoted to economic growth projections from 2003 to 2013. 
Finally, we summarize our conclusions and outline the agenda for future research.   
2. Theoretical Framework 
(1) Role of Information Technology in Economic Growth 
Moore’s Law states that the density of semiconductor chips doubles every 18-24 months. 
Doubling in 18 months is equivalent to increasing the density of chips by 100 times every 10 
years. The staggering rate of technical progress in the IT-producing industries -- 
semiconductors, computers, software, and telecommunications equipment – has led to a very 
rapid decline in IT prices. This price decline has stimulated a rapidly rising flow of 
investment into IT equipment and software by the IT-using industries in Japan and the 
United States.   
                                                  
6  This framework is used by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2002), Jorgenson (2002), and Jorgenson, 
Ho, and Stiroh (2005).    4 
 
For example, in 1990 a typical personal computer (PC) used Intel’s 386 microprocessor with a 
clock speed of 20 megahertz (MHz) for the central processing unit. Intel’s Pentium 4 
processor, used in today’s PCs, has a clock speed of 2.8 gigahertz (GHz) -- 140 times as fast. 
However, the price of a personal computer in Japan has changed very little, varying within a 
range of 200,000-500,000 yen. The technological progress in PC’s can be observed in the rapid 
improvements in performance, rather than a decline in the price of a typical machine. 
The key to capturing the rapid development of information technology is the construction of a 
price index for IT equipment and software that holds performance constant. Economic 
statisticians in Japan and the United States have used prices for matched models of IT 
products in overlapping time periods, as well as hedonic models of IT prices, to construct 
constant-quality price indexes. However, the methodology for price statistics differs between 
the two countries, making international comparisons problematical. We will return to this 
issue in the section on price data for Japan and the United States. 
(2) Production Possibility Frontier   
In order to capture the rapid pace of decline of IT prices, we employ the production possibility 
frontier introduced by Jorgenson (1995c). 
  ) , , , , ( ) , C   ,   ,   ,   , ( n L K K K K X A C I I I I Y t s c n c t s c n ⋅ = .                                 ( 1 )  
Aggregate output Y consists of non-IT investment goods n I , computer investment c I , software 
investment s I , investment in communications equipment t I , consumption of non-IT goods 
and services n C , and consumption of IT capital services by governments and households c C . 
Aggregate input X consists of non-IT capital services n K , computer services c K , software 
services s K , communications equipment services t K , and labor services L. Total factor 
productivity (TFP) or output per unit of input is denoted A.  5 
The major advantage of this approach is the explicit role it provides for modeling the impacts 
of relative price changes on IT and non-IT outputs and inputs. For example, a 
constant-quality price index for computers is used in constructing computer investment data 
on the output side. In addition, the computer price index is included in the rental price of 
computer capital services on the input side and computer investment is incorporated into the 
estimate of the stock of computers used in production. These data are used on modeling the 
substitution between computers and other outputs, as well as the substitution between the 
services of computers and other productive inputs.   
Since the production possibility frontier describes efficient combinations of outputs and 
inputs for the economy as a whole, external costs of adjustment in outputs and inputs are 
fully reflected in prices. For this reason the production possibility frontier is preferable to the 
principal competing methodology, the aggregate production function. The production function 
fails to treat relative price differences in outputs explicitly and does not incorporate costs of 
adjustment.7  
Under the assumption that product and factor markets are competitive, producer 
equilibrium implies that the share-weighted growth of outputs is the sum of the 
share-weighted growth of inputs and total factor productivity growth:   
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where  w and  v denote average value shares of outputs and inputs, respectively, in adjacent 
time periods.   
The shares of outputs and inputs add to one under the assumption of constant returns: 
1 . . . . , , , , , , = + + + + = + + + + + L t K s K c K n K c C n C t I s I c I n I v v v v v w w w w w w          ( 3 )  
                                                  
7  See Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005) for more detail on this point.    6 
In equation (2), the growth rate of outputs is a weighted average of growth rate of 
investments and consumption goods outputs. Similarly, the growth rate of inputs is a 
weighted average of growth rates of capital and labor services inputs. The contribution of 
TFP is derived as the difference between growth rates of output and input.   
(2) Theory of Capital Service Inputs 
Data on output and labor input can be collected directly from transactions in product and 
labor markets. By contrast data for capital stock and capital service prices must be imputed 
from market transactions in investment goods. We next review the measurement of capital 
stock and capital service prices.8  Since capital stock in the current time period t K , is 
comprised of capital goods acquired in previous time periods τ − t A   and the efficiency of capital 
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If we define the mortality rate  τ m as the rate of decline in efficiency  τ d for each vintage, the 
difference in capital stock between two adjacent periods is: 
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where  t R represents the replacement requirement or the decrease in capital stock due to 
morality. If, in addition, efficiency declines at a constant rate δ, capital stock takes the form: 
1 1 ) 1 ( − − − + = − + = t t t t t t K A R K A K δ      （6） 
Similarly, the price of capital services or the rental price of using a unit of capital stock for 
one time period is derived from the following capital-market non-arbitrage condition: the 
price of capital goods is the sum of future capital rentals. The price of capital goods can be 
                                                  
8  Description of this section is based on the duality between investment and capital service 
prices developed by Jorgenson (1996b).    7 
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where  t A q , and  1 , + +τ t K q are discounted prices for capital goods and capital services, 
respectively. Evaluating this expression at the current prices for capital goods and capital 
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We can use formula (7) to express the differences in acquisition prices for capital goods over 
time: 














τ τ τ （9） 
where  t D q , represents the discounted price of depreciation of capital goods. If we express 
depreciation in terms of current prices, we obtain the following: 
) ( 1 , , , 1 , , − − − − + = t A t A t D t A t t K p p p p r p      （10） 
The capital rental price  t K p ,   is the sum of the cost of capital  1 , − t A t p r  and  depreciation  t D p , , 
less capital gains on the capital good  1 , , − − t A t A p p . This is the non-arbitrage condition for the 
value of investment in capital goods and the rental value of capital services.   
When the rate of depreciation on capital is constant ( ) / 1 , , δ = − t A t D p p ), the rental price 
reduces to:   
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9  We first present the benchmark case with no taxation. The empirical estimates are based 
on a model that also takes into account the effects of taxation on capital income.  8 
A higher rate of depreciation requires the recovery of investment over a shorter period of 
time and the capital rental cost increases. Similarly, if the price of a capital good is 
decreasing more rapidly, a greater future capital loss must be anticipated and the rental cost 
increases.  
Even if the prices of two capital goods are the same, the rates of depreciation and rates of 
change in the prices of capital goods may differ, leading to different capital rental costs. 
Equation (11) is the formula we use for imputing the rental prices of capital services from the 
prices of investment goods. However, this formula must be modified possibility to incorporate 
taxes, as shown by Jorgenson and Yun (2001). The formulas used in this study will be 
described in a later section.   
3. Data 
(1) Output data 
The data for Japan used in our analysis are comparable to the U.S. data presented in 
Jorgenson (2002b). We distinguish three sectors of the Japanese economy – businesses, 
governments, and households. The data structure is presented in Table 1.   
(Table 1) 
Output data are based on official estimates of the gross domestic product (GDP), published 
by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) of the Cabinet of Office of the 
Japanese Government.   
In 2000 the Japanese System of National Accounts was revised to comply with United 
Nations (1993) System of National Accounts (SNA93). The major points of revision of the 
nominal value of GDP were (1) adding custom-made software to private and public 
investments and (2) adding depreciation of public infrastructure to government consumption. 
ESRI estimated that the impact of these accounting changes led to a 2.0% upward shift in  9 
the level of GDP in 1995 and an upward shift of 0.2% in the annual growth rate GDP in 
constant prices in 1998 and 1999. 
 
Our study uses the SNA93 current price GDP for Japan as a point of departure10. We adjust 
these data to achieve comparability with U.S. data from the U.S. National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA). One major difference between the Japanese SNA93 and NIPA is in 
the treatment of software. In The Japanese SNA93 treats custom software as an investment, 
while the U.S. NIPA also includes prepackaged and own-account software in investment. 
Therefore, we have estimated investment in prepackaged and own-account software in Japan 
and added this to the official Japanese GDP.   
Since households are included in the production sector, the capital service flow from 
consumer durables must be treated as both an output and input of households. In the 
Japanese SNA and the U.S. NIPA only capital services from owner-occupied housing are 
imputed and included in the GDP. We have treated other types of consumer durables, 
including information technology equipment and software, in the same way as housing. We 
have imputed the value of capital services for households and added this to GDP for Japan 
and the U.S., following Jorgenson (2002b). 
The government is also included in the production sector, so that the capital services from 
government capital must be treated as an output and an input of governments. In the 
Japanese SNA and the U.S. NIPA only depreciation from government capital is included in 
the GDP. However, depreciation is only one component of the price of capital services (11), so 
that we must add the cost of capital and capital losses due to declines in asset prices to the 
value of government capital services. This makes the treatment of government capital 
symmetrical to business and household capital.   
                                                  
10  ESRI published historical SNA93 data back to 1980. Prior to 1980 only SNA68 data are 
available. Therefore, we extend SNA93 data backward by using growth rates of SNA68 data.    10 
Table 2 compares output data for Japan in current prices of 2000 used in this study with the 
official Japanese GDP. The value of GDP in this study is about 534 trillion yen in 2000, 
which is about 23 trillion yen greater than the official GDP based on SNA93. About four 
trillion yen comes from adding prepackaged and own-account software investment in 
business, government, and household sectors and about 19 trillion yen comes from the 
capital service flow from consumer durables and government capital stock.   
(Table 2) 
We also note the differences between methods for deflating the current value of GDP to 
obtain GDP in constant prices in the Japanese SNA and the U.S. NIPA. In Japan, ESRI has 
recently published a chain weighted GDP index, as well as historical series back to 1994. We 
have to rely on fixed weight GDP index in Japan before 1993. By contrast the U.S. NIPA has 
incorporated a chain-weighted index for historical data on output and prices for some time. 
Since the share of information technology equipment and software in GDP is increasing 
rapidly, the role of IT investment in the Japanese economy will be under-estimated, relative 
to the U.S. In order to achieve greater comparability with U.S. data, we estimate IT and 
non-IT components separately for Japan and apply a flexible weighting scheme to estimate 
the rate of growth of output. 
  (2) Input data 
(a) Investment in information technology equipment and software 
In order to make comparisons of the impact of investment in IT equipment and software 
between the two countries, it is important to use a common definition of IT. The U.S. NIPA 
publishes both nominal and real values of investment by category of capital goods. Jorgenson 
(2002b) used the following categories of IT-related investment: computers and equipment, 
software, and communication equipment. In this study, we have defined IT investment for  11 
Japan in the same way11.  
We have generated data on investment in IT equipment for Japan that is comparable to the 
U.S. NIPA by using Japanese input-output tables. However, as discussed in the previous 
section, the definition of software in the Japanese SNA is different from the U.S. definition. 
Japanese GDP data, based on SNA93, includes only custom-made software; prepackaged and 
own-account software are excluded. Therefore, we have estimated the software investments 
in these two categories in order to match the U.S. definition. 
Although ESRI treats only custom-made software as an investment, the benchmark IO table 
for 2000, published by Japanese Statistical Bureau, has estimated the amount of 
prepackaged software to be treated as an investment. According to this table, the ratio of 
investment to total expenditure on prepackaged software is about 40%. Since the data are 
available only in 2000, we use this ratio for prepackaged software to adjust the annual 
expenditure data to generate an investment series. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry’s (METI) Survey on Selected Service Industries provides annual data on investment 
in prepackaged and custom-made software. Therefore, we use this information as well as the 
benchmark input-output tables published every five years to estimate investment in 
custom-made and prepackaged software.     
Neither Japan’s input-output tables nor METI’s Survey of Selected Service Industries 
includes investment in own-account software. We have estimated this investment using 
methods similar to those used for the U.S. NIPA, described in Parker and Grimm (2000). 
Specifically, we have estimated labor expenses for software development by employees in 
industries other than the IT sector, which produces custom-made and prepackaged software.   
Finally, Jorgenson (2002b) used expenditures on computers and software from Private 
Consumption Expenditure (PCE) in NIPA to estimate investment in IT equipment and 
                                                  
11  Specifically, the categories for computers (1995 IO category: 3311011) and computer 
peripherals (3311021) correspond to "computers and equipment," and television and radio 
(3211021), video (3211031), cable communications devices (3321011), and wireless 
communications devices (3321021) correspond to “communications equipment.”  12 
software in the household sector
12. Similarly, government expenditures on IT equipment and 
software were taken from NIPA. We have employed data from the Survey of Selected Service 
Industries as well as household and government consumption of software in the Japanese 
benchmark input-output tables to estimate investment in IT equipment and software in the 
household and government sectors.   
(b) Capital services   
In order to estimate capital services as precisely as possible, we have estimated capital stock 
and capital service prices by detailed category of investment goods. This enables us to take 
into account changes in the composition of capital stock. We have captured the improvement 
in the quality of capital associated with the substitution of investment goods with high 
marginal products, such as IT equipment and software, for goods with lower marginal 
products, such as non-IT investment goods.     
Based on Japan’s benchmark input-output tables, compiled every five years, as well as 
METI’s annual extension tables with more than 500 commodity categories, we have 
estimated investment by 62 commodity groups for business and government sectors and 20 
commodity groups for the household sector from 1970 to 2003. We have deflated this current 
price investment by the Wholesale Price Index constructed by the Bank of Japan for business 
and government investment and by the Consumer Price Index constructed by the Japanese 
Statistical Bureau for household durables. 13  
We have estimated capital stocks by the perpetual inventory method. Initial values of 
capital stock for 1973 are estimated by assuming that the real investment for each type 
of capital goods increased continuously in the past by the same growth rate as that for 
                                                  
12  The corresponding sectors of the Japanese input-output tables are those for computers 
(1995 IO category: 3311011), computer peripherals (3311021), cable communications devices 
(3321011), wireless communications devices (3321021), and software (8512011). 
13  The Japanese WPI and CPI are Laspeyres price indexes, with new benchmarks every five 
years. We constructed similar deflators for the period of our analysis. After the 2000 
benchmark the WPI will be re-named as the CGPI (Corporate Goods Price Index).    13 
the period 1970-1973.14  We have used U.S. NIPA depreciation rates for each type of 
capital goods presented by Fraumeni (1997).   
In imputing capital service prices, Equation (11) has to be modified to incorporate the 
taxation of capital income for each type of investment good in each sector. For example, 
there is a special acquisition tax for automobiles and there is no corporate tax in 
government and household sectors. Nomura (2004) took these features of the Japanese 
tax system into account, as well as many others. In this paper, we have applied the 
formulas for capital service prices used by Nomura (2004) for business, government and 
household sectors, separately.15 
(c) Labor input 
Our estimates of labor input for Japan are taken from the ICPA project of RIETI16, originally 
derived from KEIO database (Keio Economic Observatory, 1996). This is calculated by using 
the data of the number of workers, hours worked, and hourly wage rates, cross-classified by 
sex, age and education. As with data for capital services, the change in the quality of labor 
input associated with upgrading of the labor force can be captured by comparing the growth 
of hours worked with the growth of the labor input index.   
(3) Prices for investment in IT equipment and software 
We employ the production possibility frontier (1), explicitly measuring both outputs and 
inputs, so that prices of IT equipment and software affect both sides of our growth accounts. 
Since technological advances are so rapid and quality changes are so dramatic, a small 
change in methodology for measuring prices may result in significant differences in growth 
                                                  
14  In Japan, large-scale National Wealth Surveys were conducted several times prior to 1970. 
Although the results of these surveys are valuable for some purposes, for example, 
estimating war-time damages, they do not include detailed stock data on each type of 
investment good. For this reason, we have used the method described in the text to estimate 
initial values.   
15  Detailed formulas can be found in Appendix 3 of Motohashi (2002). 
16  Refer to RIETI (2004) for the ICPA project as well as classifications for this dataset.  14 
accounting. We find that there is a considerable divergence between Japanese and U.S. IT 
prices, even after controlling for relative price differences in the two economies, as shown in 
Table 3.   
(Table 3) 
Although price indexes for computers in both countries are based on hedonic methods, a 
substantial difference can be found in movements of the price index for computers and 
peripherals. This index is a composite of personal computers, large-scale computers, and 
various kinds of computer peripherals. The differences can be explained by price differences 
at the commodity level, as well as the index number methodology. A major factor behind the 
price differences is that the Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s WPI/CGPI is based on a fixed-weight 
Laspeyres index with a base that is changed only every five years, while BEA employs a 
chain-weighted index.   
Nomura and Samuels (2004) have found substantial fixed-weight bias in the Japanese WPI 
in the late 90’s because personal computers with faster price declines gained output share. 
BOJ has recognized this problem and published chain-weighted price indexes as a reference 
series. We use the BOJ chain-weighted index for computers and peripherals from 1995 to 
2003, instead of the fixed-weight Laspeyres price index employed in the Japanese national 
accounts. No chain-weighted price index for Japan is available before 1995, but differences 
between the two countries in the early 1990’s can be partly explained by NEC’s domination of 
the PC market condition in Japan, according to Nomura and Samuels.     
For communications equipment the rate of price decline is slightly higher in the Bank of 
Japan’s WPI/CGPI than in the U.S. NIPA index. Although both indexes use matched models, 
Japan’s WPI is based on a more detailed list of items and may be more accurate. We use 
BOJ’s chain-weighted price index for communications equipment, beginning in 1995. Since 
detailed commodity-level price information is available for 1985 to 1995, we employ a 
chain-weighted index for this period. as well.  15 
Finally, the BOJ’s price index for custom-made software by CSPI (company service price 
index) uses an estimate of costs that assumes no increase in labor productivity, while the U.S. 
NIPA price index uses a weighted average of costs for custom software and a hedonic price 
index for packaged software. BOJ publishes prepackaged software prices by CSPI after the 
2000 benchmark year revision, so that we use them for 2000-2003 data. Before 2000, only the 
custom-made software price is available. Since it is unrealistic to assume no productivity 
growth in Japanese software industry, “internationally harmonized” prices, based on U.S. 
price indexes, are used for prepackaged software before 2000.   
 
The basic idea of an internationally harmonized price index is to use U.S. prices of IT 
products relative to non-IT products to estimate prices of IT products relative to non-IT 
products in Japan. This approach was introduced in a series of OECD studies, for example, 
Colecchia and Schreyer (2002), and has been used in international comparisons by Van Ark 
et al. (2002). We use CGPI’s price series for custom-made software as well as own-account 
software.17  The adjusted price index used in this study is presented in Table 3.   
4. Results 
(1)Information technology and economic growth in Japan and the United States 
Table 4 gives our estimates of the contribution of information technology to output and input 
of the Japanese economy, together with the corresponding results for the U.S., based on an 
update of Jorgenson (2002b). It is possible to compare the results between two countries from 
the middle 1970’s. The results from 1980 are also displayed for Japan, since capital stock 
data in the 1970’s may be less reliable. The contribution of information technology to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) includes investments in computers, software and communication 
                                                  
17  In US national accounts, the deflator for custom-made software was formerly derived as a 
weighted average price of prepackaged and own-account software. However, after the 2002 
benchmark revision of US national accounts, the same price index is used for custom and 
own-account software.    16 
equipment by business, government, and household sectors. Capital service flows from IT 
equipment and software in government and household sectors are included in “contribution 
of non-IT”, since they are output contributions from government or household sectors, 
instead of the IT sectors.     
The growth rate of GDP in Japan dropped from about 4% in the 1980’s to less than 2% in the 
1990’s. The contribution of IT to output growth in Japan after 1995 was 0.5%, which is 
comparable to that in the U.S. About two thirds of Japanese output growth from 1995 to 
2003 can be attributed to IT production. The last half of the 1990’s was the era of American 
growth resurgence. While IT played a significant role in this resurgence, about five sixths of 
output growth can be explained by the contributions of non-IT goods and services.   
(Table 4) 
Table 4 presents the sources of growth in the two countries. The growth rate of gross 
domestic income can be decomposed among the contributions of IT capital, non-IT capital, 
and labor services. The difference in growth rates between GDI and GDP is equal to the 
growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP). Our most striking finding on the sources of 
Japanese economic growth is the surge in the contribution of capital services from IT 
equipment and software from 1995, reflecting the sharp rise of IT investment.   
The contribution of IT capital services in the U.S. rose steadily throughout the period 
1973-2003. The contribution of IT capital in Japan declined during the first half of the 1990’s, 
but rebounded strongly after 1995. The contribution of IT capital in Japan during this period 
was 0.54 percent per year, while the corresponding figure for the U.S. was 0.88 percent. 
Investment in IT capital rose rapidly in both countries. 
Our second finding is that the TFP growth rate in Japan fell after 1995, due to the slowdown 
of growth in TFP growth in the Non-IT sector. The TFP growth rate in Japan from 1995 to 
2003 is about half of that of the U.S. However, it is important to note that the growth rate of 
TFP in Japan substantially exceeded that of the U.S. throughout the period 1973-2000.    17 
An important part of the slowdown in economic growth in Japan during the 1990’s is 
attributable to the drastic decline in the contribution of labor input analyzed by Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002). The labor input contribution dropped from 0.88 percent per year before 1990 
to negative rate of -0.22 percent before 1995 and declined further to -0.32 percent after 1995. 
However, the contribution of Non-IT capital services also declined during the first half of the 
1990’s and continued to sink during the last half of the 1990’s. The contribution of labor 
input in the U.S. fell only modestly during the first half of the 1990’s and after 1995. 
The Japanese economy grew at annual rates in the 3-5% range throughout the late 1970’s 
and 1980’s. In the 1990’s growth rates dropped to the 1% range. Although more than 10 years 
have elapsed since the bursting of the “bubble economy”, there is no sign of revival in the 
official statistics. Our estimates show that the contribution of IT to economic growth becomes 
larger throughout the period of economic slowdown.   
(2) TFP decomposition between IT and non-IT 
Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) provide a model for tracing aggregate productivity 
growth to its sources at the level of individual industries. Productivity growth for each 
industry is weighted by the ratio of the gross output of the industry to GDP to obtain the 
industry’s contribution to aggregate TFP growth. The price or “dual approach” to productivity 
measurement employed by Jorgenson (2002b) identifies productivity growth in different 
sectors from differences between output and input price changes.
18  
Since the price of output falls rapidly in the IT-producing industries, the change in IT prices 
relative to the aggregate price index can be used as a proxy for the TFP growth rate.19 While 
                                                  
18  The dual approach must be carefully distinguished from aggregation over sectors. 
Jorgenson and Nomura (2005) have presented estimates based on aggregation over sectors. 
We rely on expenditure data from the Japanese national accounts, rather than data for 
individual industries.   
A detailed comparison of these alternative methodologies is presented by Jorgenson, Ho, and 
Stiroh (2005).   
19  In an industry with rapid productivity growth, output price falls rapidly relative to the 
input price. TFP growth can be measured from relative change of the input price to the 
output price. In this sense, we assume differences of factor prices changes between IT and  18 
an important part of the decline in IT prices can be attributed to the rapid decline of 
constant-quality prices for semiconductors, most semiconductors are used in the production 
of information technology equipment and other products. Accordingly, semiconductors appear 
as both an input and an output at the industry level and productivity growth in 
semiconductor production cancels out.   
Table 5 shows the contribution of TFP in IT-production to TFP growth in Japan using the 
dual method, compared to the contribution for the U.S. The nominal share of IT production 
in GDP in the late 1990’s was nearly the same for the two countries, a little more than 4%, 
and the IT contribution to the TFP growth rate was also very similar. The share of computers 
was higher in Japan than in the U.S. The relative price of computers fell faster than the 
prices of software or communication equipment in Japan, pushing up the contribution of IT 
to TFP growth. 
(Table  5)   
It should be noted that contribution of IT to total TFP growth increased after 1995, while the 
Non-IT contribution fell sharply. Compared to the U.S., the TFP growth rate in the Non-IT 
sector is greater in Japan for all periods except 1995 to 2003. As an explanation of this 
finding, Jorgenson (2003) has suggested that both Japan and the U.S. are close to the 
technology frontier in IT, while the level of Japanese technology continues to lag outside the 
IT-producing sectors. Investment in IT equipment and software has resulted in convergence 
of productivity toward U.S. levels.20  However, the rate of convergence will gradually slow.   
 (3)  Discussion 
(a) Sensitivity of data adjustments 
It is useful to compare our estimates of output in Japan with the official GDP data. As 
                                                                                                                                                             
non-IT sector are negligible as compared to output price changes.   
20  This is consistent with the findings of the studies in Jorgenson (1995b), including the 
study of Jorgenson and Kuroda (1995).    19 
described in section 3 (1), we have made adjustments in the scope of the official Japanese 
GDP data to achieve comparability with the U.S. The nominal value of GDP is adjusted by 
adding prepackaged and own-account software, excluded from the Japanese SNA93 concept 
of GDP, as well as rental services from consumer durables. In addition, we have adjusted IT 
prices in Japan in order to assess the impact of IT in the two countries.   
Table 6 presents the same data as in Table 4 (Sources of Gross Domestic Product), using the 
official statistics for Japan. The price changes have significant impacts on both output and 
input data. This discrepancy becomes wider in recent years, due to the growing importance of 
IT in Japanese economy. The annual growth rate of output after 1995 falls by 0.14%; the 
largest difference comes from computers and software.   
(Table 6) 
Slower growth of input results from a lower pace of price decline, since the growth rate of 
capital stock decreases. In addition, since the capital service price falls with a lower rate of 
price decline in equation (11), the share of IT capital services also decreases. There effects 
are revealed in the fall of the contribution of IT capital services in Table 6. Slower growth in 
outputs and inputs cancels out, so that the effect on the TFP growth rate is small. The TFP 
growth rate in the late 1990’s does not change.     
The difference in the GDP growth rates in the 1990’s comes from capital services from 
consumer durables and government capital, which are not included in the official GDP. Table 
7 shows the differences between official GDP and our estimates. As the share of the IT sector 
increases, the impact of IT prices becomes larger. As for consumer durables and the 
government capital adjustment (CD and GOV), the contribution in  the period 1975-1990 is 
negative, since the growth rate of official GDP is larger than that of CD and GOV, while it 
becomes positive after 1990. 
(Table 7)  20 
(b) Other issues in TFP estimation 
Our TFP growth rate in the 1990’s is very high by comparison with the Economic and Social 
Research Institute (2003) and Hayashi and Prescott (2002). Since these studies are based on 
the official price statistics, this is not surprising. In addition, we include land as a capital 
input, using six types of land data to take quality change into account, while the total volume 
of land is constant. Only capital services from depreciable assets are counted as capital 
inputs in the other studies. Including land in growth accounts reduces the positive 
contribution of capital services to GDP and pushes up the TFP growth rate. The shares of 
land rentals for periods 1975-90, 1990-95, and 1995-2003 are 23.2%, 45.9%, and 31.6%, 
respectively. If we eliminated land stock from our estimation, the annual TFP growth for 
each period would become smaller -- 1.14%, 0.44% and 0.37%, respectively.   
Another issue is a level of classification of capital and labor inputs. In this study, capital and 
labor inputs are estimated from Divisia indexes incorporating detailed data, classified by 
type. Labor input has a larger share and a greater impact on the TFP estimate. The 
contributions of quality changes to economic growth are +0.93%, +0.58%, and +0.56% for 
periods 1975-90, 1990-95 and 1995-2003, respectively. It we eliminated these quality changes, 
estimated TFP would become larger -- 2.68%, 1.14% and 0.76%, respectively. 
Finally, TFP is derived as a residual between the growth of output and the growth of input. 
Basu (1996) observes that TFP moves in the same direction as output and is pro-cyclical in 
the U.S.. He attributes this to the effects of market distortions. Since the Japanese economy 
experienced an economic surge in the late 1980’s and a sharp decline in the beginning of 
1990’s, some caution is needed in interpreting the TFP growth rate in these periods. In this 
sense, TFP slowdown after 1995 may be partly explained by this business cycle effect. 
5. Potential Output Growth in Japan and the U.S.   
Table 8 gives growth projections for the U.S., using the methodology developed by Jorgenson, 
Ho and Stiroh (2004). The key assumptions are, first, that hours worked grows at the same 
rate as the working age population for the next decade, plus 0.1 percent per year to allow for  21 
elimination of slack in the labor market. The second key assumption is that reproducible 
capital stock – plant, equipment and software, and inventories – rises at the same rate as 
output. Land remains fixed in supply. These assumptions characterize growth in the U.S. 
over periods longer than a typical business cycle. 
(Table 8) 
We present three alternative growth scenarios for the U.S. – a base case, an optimistic case, 
and a pessimistic case. These three scenarios use a common set of assumptions for the 
growth of hours, the growth of labor quality, the share of capital in the national income, the 
share of IT output in the GDP, and the proportion of capital stock that is reproducible. The 
scenarios differ in assumptions about total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the 
IT-producing industries and the Non-IT industries. They also differ in assumptions about the 
growth of capital quality, defined as capital input per unit of capital stock. This reflects shifts 
in the composition of capital toward less durable assets like IT hardware and software.   
The base case projection of potential output for the U.S. uses 1990-2003 averages of growth 
rates in IT and Non-IT total factor productivity and capital quality. This reflects the 
experience of the last half of the 1990s, dominated by the acceleration in TFP growth in the 
IT-producing industries, as well as the first half of the 1990s, before the acceleration took 
place. This is consistent with the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors 
(2004), which projects a continuation of a two-year product cycle through 2007 and 
resumption of the three-year cycle after that.   
The optimistic case for the U.S. uses 1995-2003 averages of growth in productivity and 
capital quality for the decade 2003-2013. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2004) have shown that 
this is in line with productivity growth in the U.S., since the recession of 2001. Even if this 
trend were to continue, U.S. growth would fall short of the historical growth rate of 4.05 
percent per year during the period 1995-2000, when growth of hours worked of 1.99 percent 
was almost double the rate of labor force growth. For the U.S. the pessimistic case involves 
reversion to trends in productivity before 1995. This would imply a substantial slowdown in 
capital quality growth, reflecting the reduced impact of IT investment. 
The base case projection of U.S. labor productivity growth is 2.21 percent per year. The drop  22 
in the projected growth of hours worked from 1.16 percent per year to 0.72 percent reduces 
the base case projection of U.S. GDP growth to 2.67 percent per year, well below the growth 
of 3.56 percent during 1995-2003. Output growth would be 3.55 percent per year in the 
optimistic case, essentially the same as the 1995-2003 growth rate. Finally, productivity 
growth in the pessimistic case would be only 1.01 percent per year, well below the level 
before 1995. The corresponding rate of growth of GDP would be only 1.73 percent per year.   
Table 9 presents our projections of Japanese economic growth for the decade 2003-2013. We 
use the same methodology as for the U.S. However, hours are projected to decline at the 
same rate as the working age population – 0.63 percent per year, partly offset by a rise of 
0.15 percent to allow for a decline in unemployment. Our base case for Japan uses 1990-2003 
averages for IT and Non-IT productivity growth and the growth of capital quality. This was a 
period of very rapid productivity growth outside of the IT-producing industries and reflects 
Japan’s continuing success in closing the productivity gap with other industrialized countries. 
However, Jorgenson (2003) shows that Japanese productivity was the lowest among the G7 
nations in 2000, so that a sizable gap remains.   
(Table 9) 
Our optimistic case for Japan is based on the productivity averages of 1995-2003 for the 
IT-producing industries, just as for the U.S. These averages are combined with growth of 
Non-IT productivity and capital quality at the more rapid rates of 1990-1995. Finally, our 
pessimistic case is based on 1990-1995 averages for IT-producing industries – the beginning 
of the so-called “lost decade.” These are combined with Non-IT productivity and capital 
quality growth at the slower rates of 1995-2003.   
Our base projection of Japanese labor productivity is 1.97 percent per year, somewhat below 
the U.S. projection of 2.21 percent. The decline of hours worked in Japan will provide 
opportunities for capital deepening. In addition, the growth of TFP in IT-production and the 
Non-IT sector will remain lower in Japan than in the U.S. On the other hand, labor quality 
growth in Japan will continue at growth rates well above the U.S. rates. These three 
components, together with elimination of the unemployment gap, will enable Japanese 
productivity growth to maintain the levels of the 1990s. Our optimistic projection of  23 
Japanese labor productivity growth is 2.37 percent per year, also below the U.S. projection of 
2.83 percent per year. On the other hand, our pessimistic projection for Japan is 1.32 percent 
per year, above the projected U.S. growth rate of 1.01 percent. 
We conclude that Japanese economic growth will continue to lag behind the U.S. This is 
implied by the projected decline in the working age population in Japan, even with a 
reduction in the unemployment rate and continued improvements in labor quality. Our 
optimistic growth projection for Japan is 1.88 percent per year for the period 2003-2013, 
substantially below the projection for the U.S. of 3.55 percent. Our pessimistic projection for 
Japan for the same period is 0.84 percent, also below the U.S. projection. Finally, our base 
case projection of Japanese GDP growth is 1.48 percent per year, well below the projected 




We have analyzed aggregate economic data for Japan and the U.S. to determine whether the 
increase in the rate of economic growth from surging IT investment in the U.S. in the late 
1990’s can also be observed in Japan. We have adjusted estimates of IT investments in Japan 
to achieve comparability with the U.S. estimates by Jorgenson (2002b). In order to make a 
rigorous comparison, we have constructed similar price deflators IT investment in Japan. We 
have also used the Japanese official statistics to assess the robustness of our results. 
We have shown that the expansion of investment in IT equipment and software in the U.S. 
during the last half of the 1990’s, accompanied by rising growth of TFP in the IT-producing 
sector, has a precise parallel in Japan. While this combination contributed to a sharp rise in 
the rate of economic growth in the U.S., it encountered a severely depressed economic 
environment in Japan. Growth rates of labor input plummeted in Japan during the 1990’s, 
dragging down the rate of economic growth. However, the rising contribution of TFP in the IT 
sector after 1995 suggests that long-term prospects for the Japanese economy are less dismal  24 
than suggested by the official statistics.   
The top priority for future research is to analyze relative levels of productivity in Japan and 
the U.S., following Jorgenson and Kuroda (1995) and Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1995). We 
believe that level comparisons will show that productivity in the IT-producing industries is 
similar in Japan and the United States. We anticipate that the IT-using industries in Japan 
lag behind their U.S. counterparts in the use of IT equipment and software, but will converge 
to U.S. levels. However, substantial parts of the Japanese economy are impervious to 
changes resulting from the adoption of IT and will continue to languish.   
For economic policy it is very important whether TFP growth is concentrated in the 
IT-producing industries, as our results for the United States suggest. We have decomposed 
TFP growth in Japan between IT and non-IT sectors, using the decline in IT prices as a 
proxy for TFP growth in the IT-producing sectors. The growth of TFP in IT-using industries 
has been relatively strong in all periods except 1995-2003, which is consistent with 
persistence of opportunities to “catch up” to U.S. levels of technology in these industries.   
In the analysis of individual industries, the effects of statistical issues arising from 
productivity measurements will be greater. For example, although productivity growth in 
service industries has been considered to be lower than that in manufacturing industries, 
this may be related to deficiencies in price deflators for service industry outputs. For example, 
the financial services industry shows particularly higher rates of investment in IT-related 
equipment and software,21  but the output of this industry may be difficult to measure.   
To avoid some of the statistical issues associated with the analysis of individual industries, 
analysis can also be conducted at a firm level. This would permit comparisons of the 
relationships of IT and productivity among businesses in the same industry. Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt (1995) conducted one of the first studies of the relationship between IT and productivity 
on a company level. More recently, the effects of IT investment on business organization have 
                                                  
21  Griliches (1994) discusses statistical issues in the measurement of service sector output as 
a source of under-estimation of the impact of IT investment.    25 
been explored by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000). Finally, IT investment covers a wide range of 
different situations -- from applications of CAD/CAM technology in manufacturing to 
applications of ERP in business services. Motohashi (2003) has shown that the effects on 
productivity vary by application.   
As illustrated by these examples, the economic analysis of investment in IT has made 
important progress in many areas. However, the rapid pace of technological advance is 
constantly generating new questions. It is vital that microeconomic analysis on a company 
level and macroeconomic analysis for the economy as a whole be properly aligned in order to 
clarify the mechanisms that underlie the structural changes resulting from the IT 
investments.  26 
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Table 1: Variables used in growth factor analysis 
 Business  sector  Public  sector Household  sector 
Output 93SNA  Official 
GDP + software 
adjustments 
93SNA Official 
GDP + software 
adjustments 
93SNA Official GDP + 
capital service from 
household 
Capital Input  (Depreciable Assets) 
-  Based on investment series by 62 
types of asset (5 types of IT), capital 
stock and capital service are 
estimated. 
(Land) 
-  Based on land stock data by 5 types 
of its category, consistent with SNA 
data. 
(Inventory) 
-  Use SNA base aggregated inventory 
stock and price to estimate capital 
service  
Based on investment 
series by 20 types of 
asset (3 types of IT), 
capital stock and 
capital service are 
estimated. 
 
Labor  Number of workers, hours worked and 
per hour wage data by sex, age and 
education category 
－ 
(Note) Refer to Motohashi (2002) for details in depreciable asset data 
Table 2: Comparing current price output in 2000 
(in billion yen)
O ffici al  G D P : 93 SNA 511462
+Software Adj ustm ent 3, 704
+Consum er Durabl es Adj ustm ent 19, 049
Adj usted O utput Data 534, 215
O ffici al  G D P : 68SNA ( reference) 490, 518  
Table 3: Comparison of IT prices 
           W P I       U S  B E A  P rice        P rice i ndex
   L aspeyres Index         for this study
1975-95 1995-03 1975-95 1995-03 1975-95 1995-03
Com puter -6. 4% -12. 0% -16. 3% -21. 2% -6. 4% -15. 5%
Co mm. Equi pm ent -1. 4% -5. 1% 1. 5% -3. 4% -1. 6% -9. 3%
Sof t war e 4. 2% -0. 2% -1. 1% -0. 9% -2. 9% -1. 5%   30 
Table 4: Sources of Gross Domestic Products 
(JAPAN) 
  1975-90 1980-90 1990-95 1995-03
Gross Domestic Product 4.03 3.97 1.64 1.28
Contribution of Information Technology 0.43 0.55 0.22 0.47
Computers 0.22 0.29 0.11 0.19
Software 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.22
Communications Equipment 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.06
Contribution of Non-Information Technology 3.61 3.42 1.41 0.81
Gross Domestic Income 2.46 2.71 0.84 0.83
Contribution of Information Technology Capital Services 0.36 0.44 0.29 0.54
Computers 0.18 0.21 0.13 0.22
Software 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.20
Communications Equipment 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.11
Contribution of Non-Information Technology Capital Services 1.01 1.08 0.77 0.62
Contribution of Labor Services 1.09 1.19 -0.22 -0.32
Total Factor Productivity 1.57 1.25 0.80 0.45
Notes: Average annual percentage rates of growth. The contribution of an output or input is the rate of growth, multiplied by the
value share.  
 
(US) 
1948-73 1973-89 1989-95 1995-03
Outputs
Gross Domestic Product 4.00 2.99 2.43 3.56
Contribution of Information Technology 0.11 0.35 0.37 0.59
Computers 0.03 0.18 0.15 0.32
Software 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.17
Communications Equipment 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09
Contribution of Non-Information Technology 3.88 2.64 2.06 2.97
Inputs
Gross Domestic Income 3.07 2.68 2.13 2.56
Contribution of Information Technology Capital Services 0.16 0.38 0.49 0.88
Computers 0.04 0.20 0.22 0.49
Software 0.02 0.07 0.16 0.22
Communications Equipment 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.17
Contribution of Non-Information Technology Capital Services 1.80 1.11 0.71 1.01
Contribution of Labor Services 1.11 1.18 0.93 0.67
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Table 5: Decomposition of TFP Growth 
（JAPAN） 
 1975-90 1990-95 1995-03
Total Factor Productivity Growth 1.57 0.80 0.45
Contributions to TFP Growth:
Information Technology 0.23 0.32 0.36
Computers 0.13 0.18 0.23
Software 0.05 0.10 0.04
Communications Equipment 0.05 0.04 0.09
Non-Information Technology 1.35 0.48 0.10
Relative Price Changes:
Information Technology -9.18 -8.51 -7.35
Computers -12.37 -10.21 -16.52
Software -4.79 -8.59 -2.45
Communications Equipment -7.52 -4.41 -9.40
Non-Information Technology -1.31 -0.47 -0.09
Average Nominal Shares:
Information Technology 2.31 3.59 4.25
Computers 1.10 1.65 1.44
Software 0.58 1.16 1.92
Communications Equipment 0.63 0.78 0.90
Non-Information Technology 97.69 96.41 95.75  
（US） 
1948-73 1973-89 1989-95 1995-03
Total Factor Productivity Growth 0.93 0.31 0.31 0.99
Information Technology 0.05 0.20 0.23 0.46
Computers 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.31
Software 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.06
Communications Equipment 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.08
Non-Information Technology 0.88 0.11 0.08 0.53
Information Technology -4.3 -9.1 -7.5 -11.5
Computers -21.9 -21.5 -15.2 -31.3
Software -5.0 -5.1 -5.3 -3.9
Communications Equipment -3.1 -4.7 -3.9 -6.7
Non-Information Technology -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6
Information Technology 0.91 2.20 3.04 4.04
Computers 0.10 0.64 0.83 0.97
Software 0.07 0.49 1.12 1.78
Communications Equipment 0.74 1.07 1.08 1.28
Non-Information Technology 99.09 97.80 96.96 95.96
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Table 6 Sources of GDP by using Official Price Data in Japan 
  1975-90 1980-90 1990-95 1995-03
Gross Domestic Product 3.98 3.89 1.55 1.14
Contribution of Information Technology 0.37 0.47 0.14 0.34
Computers 0.22 0.29 0.11 0.14
Software 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.19
Communications Equipment 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.02
Contribution of Non-Information Technology 3.61 3.42 1.41 0.80
Gross Domestic Income 2.40 2.64 0.73 0.69
Contribution of Information Technology Capital Services 0.30 0.36 0.18 0.40
Computers 0.18 0.21 0.13 0.17
Software 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.16
Communications Equipment 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07
Contribution of Non-Information Technology Capital Services 1.01 1.08 0.77 0.62
Contribution of Labor Services 1.09 1.19 -0.22 -0.32
Total Factor Productivity 1.57 1.25 0.82 0.45
Notes: Average annual percentage rates of growth. The contribution of an output or input is the rate of growth, multiplied by the
value share.  
 
Table 7: Comparison of output with official GDP in Japan 
1975-90 1990-95 1995-03
O ffici al  S tatisti cs (93 SNA) 4. 03% 1. 53% 0. 95%
+I T pri ce adj ustm ent 0. 05% 0. 09% 0. 14%
+CD and GO V  adj ustm ent. -0. 05% 0. 02% 0. 19%
Fi nal  G D P  grow th rate 4.03% 1. 64% 1. 28%  
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Table 8: Growth Projections from 2003 to 2013 in United States 
Pessimistic Base-case Optimistic
Output Growth 1.73 2.93 3.55
ALP Growth 1.01 2.21 2.83
Effective Capital Stock 1.46 2.48 3.00
Hours Growth 0.723 0.723 0.723
Labor Quality Growth 0.087 0.087 0.087
Capital Share 0.410 0.410 0.410
IT Output Share 0.039 0.039 0.039
Reproducible Capital Stock Share 0.846 0.846 0.846
TFP Growth in IT 8.67 10.02 11.51
Implied IT-related TFP Contribution 0.21 0.37 0.45
Other TFP Contribution 0.10 0.38 0.54
Capital Quality Growth 0.84 1.66 2.08
Implied Capital Deepening Contribution 0.65 1.40 1.79
Notes: In all projections, hours growth and labor quality growth are from internal projections, capital share
and reproducible capital stock shares are 1959-2003 averages, and IT output shares are for 1995-2003.
Pessimistic case uses 1973-1995 average growth of capital quality, IT-related TFP growth, and non-IT TFP
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Table 9: Growth Projection from 2003 to 2013 in Japan 
Pessimistic Base-case Optimistic
Output Growth 0.84 1.48 1.88
ALP Growth 1.32 1.97 2.37
Effective Capital Stock 0.56 1.00 1.27
Hours Growth -0.483 -0.483 -0.483
Labor Quality Growth 0.430 0.430 0.430
Capital Share 0.393 0.393 0.393
IT Output Share 0.043 0.043 0.043
Reproducible Capital Stock Share 0.674 0.674 0.674
TFP Growth in IT 7.53 8.11 8.47
Implied IT-related TFP Contribution 0.32 0.34 0.36
Other TFP Contribution 0.10 0.33 0.48
Capital Quality Growth 0.58 1.13 1.47
Implied Capital Deepening Contribution 0.64 1.03 1.27
Notes: Hours growth is from the Institute for Population and Social Security. Labor quality growth are from
internal projections. Capital share and reproducible capital stock shares are 1975-2003 averages. IT output
shares are for 1995-2003. Pessimistic case uses 1990-1995 average growth IT-related TFP growth, and 1995-
2003 average non-IT TFP contribution and capital quality growth. Base case uses 1990-2003 averages for al l
of them. Optimistic cases uses 1995-2003 averages for IT-related TFP growth and 1990-1995 non-IT TFP
contribution and capital quality growth.
Projections
Projections
Common Assumptions
Alternative Assumptions
 